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Abstract
We explore how tax evasion by firms aﬀects the growth- and welfare-maximizing rates
of corporate income tax (CIT) in an endogenous growth model with productive public ser-
vice. We show that the negative eﬀect of CIT on growth is mitigated in the presence of tax
evasion. This increases the benefit of raising the CIT rate for public service provision. Thus,
in contrast to Barro (1990), the optimal tax rate is higher than the output elasticity of public
service. Through numerical exercises, we demonstrate that the role of tax evasion by firms
is quantitatively significant.
Keywords: corporate income tax, tax evasion, growth, welfare
We are grateful to Shingo Ishiguro, So Kubota, Kazutoshi Miyazawa, Ryoji Ohdoi, Makoto Saito, Daichi Shirai,
Koki Sugawara, Yuta Takahashi, Akira Yakita, and Taiyo Yoshimi for their helpful comments. We also thank the
participants of the 2018 Public Economic Theory Conference, Journe´es LAGV 2018, 2018 Australasian Meeting
of Econometric Society, MUETEI workshop at Meisei University, Nagoya Macroeconomic Workshop, Economic
Theory and Policy Workshop, the Macro Money Workshop at Hitotsubashi University, and the Economics Seminar
at Tokyo International University. We are responsible for any remaining errors.
yDepartment of Industrial Engineering and Economics, School of Engineering, Tokyo Institute of Technology,
2-12-1, Ookayama, Meguro-ku, Tokyo, 152-8552, Japan. E-mail address: hori.t.ag@m.titech.ac.jp
zFaculty of Economics and Business Administration, The University of Kitakyushu, 4-2-1, Kitagata, Kokura
Minami-ku, Kitakyushu, Fukuoka 802-8577, Japan. E-mail address: non818mn@kitakyu-u.ac.jp
xDepartment of Economics, Meisei University, 2-1-1, Hodokubo, Hino, Tokyo 191-8506, Japan. E-mail address:
keiichi.morimoto@meisei-u.ac.jp
1 Introduction
Corporate income tax (hereafter, CIT) has detrimental eﬀects on investment by firms. Modern
prevailing opinions advocate that CIT should be cut to promote economic growth. In reality,
governments in developed countries have lowered the CIT rate in recent years: The average rate
of CIT in OECD countries decreased from 32.5% to 24.2% between 2000 and 2017. 1 However,
because CIT is an important tax basis for public finance, cutting the CIT rate reduces public
investment in infrastructure (productive public services) and may lower the rate of economic
growth (e.g., Barro 1990).2 Therefore, setting CIT rates involves a trade-oﬀ between private
investment and the provision of productive public services for economic growth, and it is an
important policy issue.
In addition, tax evasion by firms is a serious problem of CIT. There is large-scale tax evasion
in real economies. For example, in the US, the Internal Revenue Service (2016) reports about 44
billion dollars as the estimated tax gap of CIT on annual average from 2008 to 2010.3 Nonethe-
less, the actual audit coverage of taxed corporations is very limited, primarily because of fiscal
tightness; only 1.0% of taxed returns were examined in the US in 2016 and only 3.1% of all taxed
corporations were audited in Japan in 2015.4
One of the most general ways of tax evasion is to underdeclare income (e.g., Allingham and
Sandmo 1972). To underdeclare corporate income, firms may pretend to have lower productivity
and overstate their costs. In reality, there is institutional cause for such tax evasion behavior at
the microeconomic level. The CIT systems in many countries have reduction and exemption
measures; deficits of corporations can be carried forward and CITs of corporations with small
income are reduced or exempted. Such systems give corporations an incentive to underdeclare
their profit intentionally by overstating cost. These are neither unusual nor insignificant at the
macroeconomic level. For example, the National Tax Agency (2016) reports that more than two-
thirds of the ordinary corporations in Japan were loss corporations between 2011 and 2015 on
1According to the policy stance of President Trump, the US government reduced the CIT rate to 21%. In Japan,
the government plans to cut the CIT rate to about 20% gradually under some conditions.
2In fact, CIT occupies a considerable fraction of the annual revenue of the public sector. For example, the Internal
Revenue Service (2017) and the National Tax Agency (2017) report that the shares of CIT to total tax revenues were
about 10% in the US in 2016 and 19% in Japan in 2015, respectively.
3Here, the “tax gap” is the “gross tax gap” in the Internal Revenue Service’s survey. This is defined as the amount
of true tax liability that is not paid voluntarily and timely. For details, see Internal Revenue Service (2016).
4The sources of these facts are Internal Revenue Service (2017) and National Tax Agency (2016).
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average. The reported losses amounted to 11.3 billion yen in 2015 and occupied a quarter of the
reported total income of the corporate sector.
With these problems of CIT as motivation, this study investigates an optimal CIT policy in
a growing economy with tax evasion by firms. The evaded tax payments are utilized for private
investment, while a part of the tax revenue is lost. This aﬀects the trade-oﬀ between private
investment and the provision of productive public services. We are particularly interested in how
CIT evasion by firms changes the optimal rate of CIT.
To tackle this problem, we construct a variety-expansion model of growth in which private
firms invest to earn monopolistic profits and their investments sustain economic growth. 5 A
single final good is produced by using intermediate goods. Each intermediate good is produced
by amonopolistically competitive firm. Each intermediate good firm invests to enter into business
and pursues monopolistic profits. CIT discourages private investment because the monopolistic
profits are subject to CIT. On the other hand, productive public services have a positive eﬀect on
the monopolistic profits of intermediate good firms. Thus, CIT has a positive eﬀect on private
investment through productive public services financed by CIT.
In our model, facing CIT, firms have an incentive to evade tax payment by underdeclaring
their profits in the absence of a perfect tax enforcement system. Because each firm can avoid a
part of tax payment, tax evasion weakens the discouraging eﬀect of CIT on private investment.
Simultaneously, tax evasion reduces the provision of productive public services. Thus, tax eva-
sion by the corporate sector aﬀects private investment, provision of productive public services,
and economic growth.
In a tractablemodel, we obtain a qualitative result that both the growth- andwelfare-maximizing
CIT rates are higher than the output-elasticity of public service. This is in contrast to the familiar
Barro’s (1990) rule, which indicates that the tax rate should be set at the output elasticity of public
services. The mechanism behind our result is as follows. When the government raises the CIT
rate, the eﬀective CIT rate and the tax revenue rise.6 This increases the provision of productive
public services and promotes economic growth. Simultaneously, raising the CIT rate discour-
ages private investment and has a detrimental eﬀect on growth. However, this negative eﬀect on
growth is weakened by tax evasion. This is because, in response to a tax hike, firms attempt to
5We follow Barro and Sala-ı´-Martin’s (2004) variety-expansion model.
6Here, we mean that the eﬀective tax rate is the ratio of the actually collected CIT revenue to the true profits of
firms.
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secure profits by increasing tax evasion. It alleviates the reduction in private investment and the
tax base of CIT. CIT evasion generates the benefits of raising the CIT rate for the provision of
productive public services.
Next, we extend the model to obtain quantitative results. Our quantitative analyses show that
tax evasion significantly raises the optimal CIT rate. In particular, the optimal tax rate is 40%
for the benchmark case, which is much higher than the standard values of the output elasticity of
public service, e.g., 10%. This optimal CIT rate in our model, at 40%, is close to that in Aghion
et al. (2016) mentioned below. Besides, we decompose the diﬀerence between the optimal tax
rate and the output elasticity of public service into several parts including a part associated with
the eﬀect of CIT evasion. We find that the eﬀect of CIT evasion occupies more than half of the
total diﬀerence between the optimal tax rate and the output elasticity of public service for a wide
range of reasonable parameter values. That is, even quantitatively, the eﬀect of CIT evasion is
the main source of the high optimal tax rate.
Related Literature
Largely, our study is part of the literature starting with Barro (1990), which explores optimal
taxation in an endogenous growth model with productive public service (capital) (e.g., Futagami
et al, 1993; Glomm and Ravikumar, 1994; Turnovsky 1997).7 These studies emphasize that the
growth-maximizing income tax rate equals the output elasticity of public capital and it coincides
with the welfare-maximizing one in the balanced growth path. This is the so-called Barro rule.
More recent studies cast some doubts on the Barro rule. Some studies (e.g., Futagami et al.
1993; Ghosh and Roy 2004; Age´nor 2008) show that the welfare-maximizing tax rate is lower
than the growth-maximizing one (output elasticity of public capital), while other studies (e.g.,
Kalaitzidakis and Kalyvitis 2004; Chang and Chang 2015) show the opposite result.8 While these
existing studies consider neither CIT nor tax evasion, our study investigates optimal taxation,
7Some empirical studies suggest the importance of productive public expenditure for economic growth. Abiad
et al. (2016) show that increases in public investment in infrastructure raise output in both the short and long run.
8Futagami et al.’s (1993) finding works if the policy eﬀects during the transition path caused by the accumulation
of public capital is evaluated. Ghosh and Roy (2004) consider the composite output externality between the stock
of public capital and the flow of public services. Kalaitzidakis and Kalyvitis (2004) consider the trade-oﬀ of public
expenditure between new investment and the maintenance of existing public capital. Age´nor (2008) considers public
health capital in addition to general infrastructure. Chang and Chang (2015) consider an endogenous growth model
with market imperfection both in goods and labor markets and show that welfare-maximizing productive government
spending can be larger than growth-maximizing spending if it is financed by capital income taxes.
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theoretically and quantitatively, incorporating CIT evasion.9
Among the existing studies of tax evasion and growth, we should refer to Chen (2003) and
Kafkalas et al. (2014). They investigate tax evasion by household-firms in Barro’s (1990) type
model, in which government incurs inspection expenditure to audit taxpayers. These authors
focus on the trade-oﬀ between the government’s inspection expenditure and public investment.
Chen (2003) shows that the growth-maximizing announced tax rate is higher than the output
elasticity of public service, under the assumptions that inspection expenditure is proportional
to output and household-firms must incur tax evasion costs. On the other hand, Kafkalas et al.
(2014) assume that the government’s inspection expenditure is proportional to tax revenues. They
show that, even with tax evasion, the growth-(and utility-) maximizing eﬀective tax rate equals
the output elasticity of public capital, in line with Barro’s rule.
In contrast to these studies, we do not focus on the role of inspection expenditure. Therefore,
we adopt the same specification of inspection expenditure as Kafkalas et al. (2014), which does
not aﬀect Barro’s rule. Thus, we can concentrate on the role of tax evasion behavior of firms with
market power.
Although the findings on optimal tax rates from Chen (2003) and Kafkalas et al. (2014) are
interesting, there are some reservations. First, they consider tax evasion by household-firms,
where the firm is the same as a household. Since there is no diﬀerence between CIT and a
household’s income tax in their models, they do not consider the role of CIT evasion. Second,
they assume a competitive goods market, and therefore, ignore tax evasion associated with profit
maximization in an imperfectly competitive product market.10 Thus, although tax evasion aﬀects
the aggregate economy through the government budget in their models, these studies do not
consider the role of tax evasion in the production side directly.
Our study is also comparable to Aghion et al. (2016). They examine the relationship among
corporate taxation, growth, and welfare, focusing on corruption. Aghion et al. (2016) construct
9Age´nor and Neanidis (2017) show empirically that public capital aﬀects growth through productivity and inno-
vation (R&D) capacity.
10Some theoretical studies investigate the role of public capital on growth under an imperfectly competitive prod-
uct market. Pereto (2007) explores this issue in an R&D-based growth model where the market structure (entry and
exit of firms) is endogenously determined. Pereto (2007) shows that productive public capital is neutral to growth,
and therefore, no optimal tax exists. On the other hand, Chang and Chang (2015) advocate that infrastructure aﬀects
growth and optimal tax rates exist in an endogenous growth model, which includes monopolistic competition in the
goods market and unionization in the labor market. The recent empirical study of Age´nor and Neanidis (2017) may
support the latter result.
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an endogenous growthmodel inwhich public capital raises the expected returns to entrepreneurial
eﬀorts on R&D but tax revenue decreases due to the corruption of oﬃcers after tax collection.
They suggest that the relationship between CIT rate and growth is an inverted-U shape and the
welfare-maximizing CIT rate is 42% in the calibrated model. However, Aghion et al. (2016) do
not consider tax evasion by firms but focus on the corruption between government and house-
holds. In this study, we incorporate corporate tax evasion in an endogenous growth model and
suggest that the optimal CIT rate is as high as Aghion et al.’s (2016) estimate.
2 Model
Time is discrete and denoted by t = 0; 1;   . The economy is inhabited by the following
four types of agents: producers of final output, producers of intermediate goods, a representative
household, and government. An infinitely lived representative household has perfect foresight
and is endowed with L unit of labor. Labor moves freely across diﬀerent production sectors. The
number of intermediate good in period t is Nt. We assume N0 = 1 without loss of generality.
2.1 Producers of final good
A single final output is produced by perfectly competitive producers using the following technol-
ogy:
Yt = AL
1 
Y;t
Z Nt
0
(Gtxi;t)
di; A > 0; 0 <  < 1; (1)
where Yt is output, LY;t is labor input in the final goods sector, and xi;t is the input of intermediate
good i. Following Barro (1990), public services, Gt, increases the productivity of output. We
take the final output as the numeraire. Although  encompasses both (i) the output elasticity
of public services and (ii) the price elasticity of intermediate goods 1=(1   ), we examine the
former in this simple model. In the extended model (Section 5), we separate (i) and (ii). We
denote the price of intermediate good i and wage rate as pi;t and wt, respectively. The profit
maximization yields
wt = (1  )AL Y;t
Z Nt
0
(Gtxi;t)
di = (1  ) Yt
LY;t
; (2)
pi;t = AL
1 
Y;t G

t x
 1
i;t : (3)
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Solving (2) and (3) with respect to xi;t yields the demand function for the product of firm i:
x(pi;t)  (1  )Yt
wt
 
AGt
pi;t
! 1
1 
:
2.2 Producers of intermediate goods
2.2.1 Entry into the intermediate goods market
Each intermediate good is produced by a monopolistically competitive firm. To operate in period
t, each intermediate good firm must invest  unit of the final good in period t  1. Firms finance
the cost of this investment by borrowing from households. Because firms must incur investment
costs in each period, the planning horizon of each firm is one period, as in Young (1998). When
incurring investment costs, each firm draws its productivity b > 0 from distribution F (b). We
assume that (i) b is independent and identically distributed (iid) over time as well as across firms
and (ii) b is private information. These two assumptions are useful in describing an environment
where the true tax base of each firm cannot be observable without auditing firms, as we explain
in the next subsection. Besides, heterogeneity among firms’ productivity enables us to describe
the realistic firm size distribution for the quantitative analysis in Section 5.
Let us denote the expected after-tax operating profit of a firmwith productivity b in period t by
ei;t. ei;t depends on b. The next subsection discusses ei;t in detail. The objective of intermediate
good firm i that invests in period t  1 is given by
i;t 1 =
1
Rt 1
Z
ei;tdF (b)  ; (4)
where Rt 1 is the gross interest rate between periods t  1 and t. Since b is iid across firms, all
firms face the same t 1 in period t  1. Free entry into the intermediate goods market impliesZ
ei;tdF (b) = Rt 1: (5)
2.2.2 Maximization of operating profits
The price of each intermediate good pi;t is public information. A firm with productivity b needs
1=b unit of labor to produce one unit of intermediate good. The true operating profit of firm i is
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given by
i;t =

pi;t   wt
bi

x(pi;t): (6)
We use the word “true” to distinguish the true operating profit from the operating profit that firm
i declares, ~i;t, to the government. Since b is private information, the government cannot directly
observe the true operating profit, i;t, and thus, cannot know whether ~i;t equals i;t without
auditing firms.
Let us denote the announced CIT rate by  2 (0; 1]. The after-tax profit of each firm is given
by i;t   ~i;t because CIT is imposed on declared profit ~i;t. We denote the probability of audit
by q 2 [0; 1]. We impose an assumption on q later. Suppose that a firm is audited. If this firm
underdeclares its operating profit (~i;t < i;t), it has to pay a penalty of (1 + s)(i;t   ~i;t),
where s( 0) is an additional tax rate. If this firm overdeclares its operating profit (~i;t > i;t),
the overpayment, (~i;t   i;t), is refunded. The expected after-tax operating profit of firm i is
given by
ei;t = i;t    ~i;t   q(1 + s) maxf0; i;t   ~i;tg+ q maxf0; ~i;t   i;tg: (7)
Firm i chooses ~i;t and pi;t to maximize ei;t. Given i;t, ei;t decreases with ~i;t if ~i;t > i;t.
Thus, no firms overdeclare their operating profits. The inequality ~i;t  i;t must be satisfied in
the following discussion.
Our specification of tax evasion behavior is essentially similar to Allingham and Sandmo
(1972). They consider tax evasion by a representative household, which evades income tax by
choosing declared income when its actual income is not known directly by the government. In
our setting, each firm chooses its declared profit by adjusting the price level.
Using (7), we have the following lemma.
Lemma 1: Suppose that a firm setting the price at ~pi;t declares its operating profits truthfully,
~i;t = i;t. Then, the declared profit of this firm satisfies
~i;t = (1  )~pi;tx(~pi;t): (8)
Proof: See Appendix A.
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Since the contraposition of a true claim is also true, we can conclude that if a firm does not
declare (8), it does not declare its true profit. Thus, we assume that any firms whose declared
profits do not satisfy (8) are audited with the probability of one. In addition, we assume that if a
firm declares (8), the firm is audited with a probability that is lower than one. Note that (8) is a
necessary condition for true declaration of profits. Thus, a firm declaring (8) does not necessarily
declare its profit truthfully.
Assumption: Consider a firm that sets the price at ~pi;t.
(i) If the firm’s declared profit does not satisfy (8), the firm is audited with a probability of one,
q = 1.
(ii) If the firm’s declared profit satisfies (8), the firm is audited with a probability that is lower
than one, q = q 2 [0; 1).
Since ~i;t  i;t, we now rewrite (7) as ei;t = (1   ~)i;t, where ~ is the eﬀective CIT rate
and is defined as
~ 

[1  q(1 + s)] ~i;t
i;t
+ q(1 + s)

: (9)
The following proposition shows each firm’s decisions on profit declaration and pricing.
Proposition 1. (i) Suppose that 1   q(1 + s)  0. Then, all firms declare their true profit
~i;t = i;t. Firms with productivity b set the price at ~pi;t = wt=(bi). The declared profit satisfies
(8). The true and the expected after-tax operating profit are, respectively, given by
i;t = ~i;t = (1  )~pi;tx(~pi;t) and ei;t = (1  ~)(1  )~pi;tx(~pi;t): (10)
The eﬀective CIT rate coincides with the announced CIT rate, ~ =  .
(ii) Suppose that 1  q(1 + s) > 0. Firms with productivity bi set the price at
~pi;t =
wt
bi
 (); where  ()  1  q(1 + s)
1  q(1 + s)   (1  )[1  q(1 + s)] > 1: (11)
The declared profit satisfies (8). The true and the expected after-tax operating profit are, respec-
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tively, given by
i;t =
 
1   () 1 ~pi;tx(~pi;t) > ~i;t; (12)
ei;t = (1  ~)
 
1   () 1 ~pi;tx(~pi;t): (13)
The inequality i;t > ~i;t indicates that all firms underdeclare their operating profits. The eﬀec-
tive CIT rate, ~ 2

0; 1+q(1+s)
1+
i
, satisfies that ~ <  .
Proof: See Appendix B.
Proposition 1 states that the firms control their declared profits according to whether tax
evasion is beneficial. If the expected additional tax rate is higher than the rate under honest
declaration (1  q(1 + s)), firms have no incentive to underdeclare profits. Thus, they declare
true profits (~i;t = i;t).
In contrast, if the expected additional tax rate is lower than the rate under honest declaration
(1 > q(1+s)), firms choose to evade CIT by underdeclaring profits (~i;t < i;t). This is captured
by the term  () in (12), because the only diﬀerence between the true profit  in (10) and declared
profit ~ in (12) is the presence of  (). 11
Note the following. When q(1 + s) > 1, because firms declare true profit and tax evasion
does not occur, the CIT has nothing to do with firms’ control of their profits. However, when
q(1+s) < 1, the CIT rate aﬀects tax evasion substantially through the term,  (). By  0() > 0,
an increase in the CIT rate causes a larger diﬀerence between the true profit i;t and declared
profit ~i;t. Thus, we find that it encourages tax evasion. Appendix C shows that d(=~)=d > 0
if and only if  0() > 0. 12
Remarks
The properties d~=d > 0 and d(=~)=d > 0 are in line with Roubini and Sala-ı´-Martin (1995)
and Kafkalas et al. (2014).13 However, the tax evasion considered in our model departs from
11They underdeclare profits by pretending to be lower productivity firms, which leads to a higher price setting
( () > 1) as represented by (11).
12Equation (9) indicates that the degree of tax evasion in response to a tax hike, d(i;t=~i;t)=d , is reduced to
d(=~)=d .
13We obtain d(=~)=dq < 0 (see Appendix C) as in Roubini and Sala-ı´-Martin (1995) and Kafkalas et al. (2014).
Both studies assume that the diﬀerence between the announced and the eﬀective tax rate increaseswith the announced
tax rate  and decreases with the detection probability q.
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these previous studies in the following respects.
First, tax evasion in our model is derived endogenously from the microfoundation of firms’
tax evasion behavior, in contrast to the ad-hoc expression by Roubini and Sala-ı´-Martin (1995).
Second, Chen (2003) and Kafkalas et al. (2014) do not consider tax evasion associated with
profit maximization in an imperfectly competitive product market. Thus, there is no relationship
between the tax rates and the firms’ choice of profits and declarations of profits in their models.
In contrast, in our model, the CIT rate aﬀects them substantially, as represented by  () > 1 and
 0() > 0.
2.3 Household
The population size is constant at one. The utility function of a representative household is
U0 =
1X
t=0

1
1 + 
t
u(Ct); u(Ct) =
C1 t
1   ;  > 0: (14)
u(Ct) = lnCt, when  = 1. Here, Ct, (> 0) and 1= denote consumption in period t, the
subjective discount rate, and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, respectively. The rep-
resentative household supplies L unit of labor inelastically. The household’s budget constraint
is given by Wt = Rt 1Wt 1 + wtL   Ct, where Wt 1 is assets at the end of period t   1. The
household’s utility maximization yields
Ct+1
Ct
=

Rt
1 + 
1=
; (15)
and the transversality condition (TVC) is
lim
t!1
C t Wt 1
(1 + )t
= 0: (16)
2.4 Government
We assume that the government keeps a balanced budget in each period. From (7) and (9), the
aggregate tax revenue of the government is
R Nt
0
R f ~i;t + q(1 + s) [i;t   ~i;t]gdF (b)di =
~
R Nt
0
R
i;tdF (b)di = ~Nt
R
i;tdF (b). Here, we use the fact that b is iid across firms. This
revenue is allocated to productive government spending,Gt, and inspection expenditure to detect
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tax evasion,Mt. Thus, the budget constraint of the government is given by
~Nt
Z
i;tdF (b) = Gt +Mt: (17)
We assume that spending a constant fraction, Q(q), of government revenue on Mt leads to a
successful detection of tax evasion by a firm with probability q, where Q0(q) > 0, Q(q) 2
[0; 1) for q 2 [0; 1], and Q(0) = 0. Therefore, the inspection expenditure is given by Mt =
Q(q)~Nt
R
i;tdF (b). This specification ofMt is in line with Kafkalas et al. (2014). Thus, (17)
reduces to
Gt = [1 Q(q)]~Nt
Z
i;tdF (b): (18)
As mentioned in Introduction, such a specification allows us to isolate the role of tax evasion by
firms with market power for pursuing Barro’s rule. This is because Kafkalas et al.’s (2014) result
indicates that Barro’s rule holds even with the tax evasion of perfectly competitive firms under
inspection expenditure of the form in (18).
3 Equilibrium
The labor market clears as
L = LY;t +Nt
Z
xi;t
b
dF (b): (19)
The entry cost of intermediate good market  is financed by borrowing from households. Since
Nt+1 firms invest in period t, the asset market equilibrium condition is given by Wt = Nt+1.
The final good market clears as Yt = Ct + Nt+1 +Gt +Mt.
We next characterize the dynamic system and the steady state of the economy. Appendix D
derives the following dynamic system with respect to zt  Ct=Nt.
zt+1 =
1 
1
 [(1  ~)(1   1)
(~)=(1 + )]1=zt
[1  ~(1   1)]
(~)  zt ; (20)
where
 =
8><>:1 if 1  q(1 + s)  0 () if 1  q(1 + s) > 0;
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and
Yt
Nt
= 
(~) A 11  (1 Q(q))~  1   1 1  (1  ) 21 


L
(1  ) + 2
 1
1 
Z
b

1 dF (b)

: (21)
From (20), we arrive at the following proposition.
Proposition 2. A unique steady state exists. In the steady state, zt takes the following constant
value:
z^ =

1  ~  1   1
(~)   (1  ~)  1   1(1 + ) 1 1
(~)1= 2 (0; z);
(22)
where z  [1  ~ (1   1)] 
(~). In the steady state, Ct, Nt, and Yt grow at the same
constant rate:
g^ =

(1  ~)  1   1(1 + ) 1 1
(~)1= : (23)
The economy jumps to the steady state initially.
Proof: See Appendix E.
4 Optimal CIT Rates
As mentioned in Section 2, the CIT rate substantially aﬀects the tax evasion behavior of firms in
the imperfectly competitive market. Therefore, we analyze the growth- and welfare-maximizing
CIT rates under such CIT evasion. 14
4.1 Growth-maximizing CIT Rate
We obtain the following proposition.
14Note that the parameters q and s are really endogenously selected by the governments in that the government
controls tax enforcement and punishment against tax evasion. However, to concentrate on the choice of optimal
CIT and keep the analyses simple, we ignore these policy dimensions and assume that they are exogenous param-
eters. This assumption is in line with Johansen (2010) who assume that parameters related to tax enforcement and
punishment against profit shifting by multinational firms are exogenous.
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Proposition 3. Let us denote the growth-maximizing announced CIT rate and growth-maximizing
eﬀective CIT rate as GM and ~GM , respectively.
1. When 1  q(1 + s)  0 and each firm declares its true operating profit, ~GM = GM = 
holds.
2. When 1  q(1+ s) > 0 and each firm underdeclares its operating profit, GM > ~GM > 
holds.
Proof: See Appendix F.
The first part of Proposition 3 is in line with Barro’s (1990) rule, that is, the tax rate that
maximizes long-run growth equals the output elasticity of public services, . This result is also
consistent with that of Kafkalas et al. (2014), indicating that even with government spending for
detection, the growth-maximizing tax rate coincides with the output elasticity of public services.
Importantly, the mechanism behind this result is the same as that of Barro (1990). In Barro’s
model, the growth-maximizing rule is attributed to the following trade-oﬀ between income tax
and growth. On the one hand, an increase in income tax decreases the net interest rate ((1 tax
rate) interest rate) and has a negative eﬀect on growth. On the other hand, an increase in income
tax boosts productive government spending and raises the interest rate. This has a positive eﬀect
on growth.
The interest rate in our model is determined through the free entry condition of intermediate
goods firms as
Rt 1 =  1
Z
ei;tdF (b) = 
 1(1  ~)(1   1)Yt=Nt: (24)
Here, Yt=Nt, given in (21), is positively aﬀected by15
Gt = [1 Q(q)]~Nt
Z
i;tdF (b) = [1 Q(q)]~(1   1)Yt: (25)
This induces essentially the same trade-oﬀ as Barro (1990). Thus, in the absence of tax evasion
( = 1), we obtain the same result as Barro (1990).
15See Appendix D for the derivation of (24) and (25).
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The second part of Proposition 3 states that with underdeclaration of profit, the growth-
maximizing announced CIT rate is higher than the growth-maximizing eﬀective CIT rate, GM >
~GM . Moreover, both are higher than the output elasticity of public services, . That is, tax eva-
sion by firms increases the growth-maximizing tax rates, GM and ~GM . GM > ~GM stems
simply from the evasion of CIT by firms. Then, we consider the intuition behind the result of
~GM >  here.
As we have seen after Proposition 1, in response to a tax hike, each intermediate good firm
increases tax evasion. This secures the expected operating after-tax profit, ei;t, and private in-
vestment. Because the true operating profit, i;t, is also secured, the tax base for public service
provision (= Nt
R
i;tdF (b)) is maintained. 16 These are caused by the eﬀect of CIT evasion
associated with profit maximization in an imperfectly competitive product market, which are
captured by the term 1   1 in (24) and (25), where  =  () and  0() > 0. Hereafter, we
call this simply the eﬀect of CIT evasion. The eﬀect of CIT evasion mitigates the negative eﬀect
of CIT on growth and increases the benefit of raising the CIT rate for the provision of productive
public services. 17
Our result (~GM > ) is diﬀerent from Kafkalas et al. (2014), who advocate that Barro’s
rule holds (~GM = ) even in the economy with tax evasion. While tax evasion does not aﬀect
firms’ decision-making in Kafkalas et al (2014), our model includes the eﬀect of CIT evasion as
mentioned above, which causes ~GM > . 18
16Indeed, the disparity between the announced and eﬀective CIT rates is enlarged by the strong tax evasion due
to the tax hike. At a glance, this is likely to damage public service provision. However, at the same time, such an
increase in tax evasion holds the tax base, Nt
R
i;tdF (b) = (1   1)Yt.
17Except for the eﬀect of CIT evasion, there exist general equilibrium eﬀects in our model. An increase in ~pi;t
reduces the demands of intermediate good in the final good sector, x(~pi;t). This exerts the following opposite eﬀects
on Rt 1. On the one hand, a fall in x(~pi;t) reduces ei;t and lowers Rt 1. On the other hand, a fall in x(~pi;t) causes
a labor shift from the intermediate to final good sector, which increases final output and raises Rt 1. However,
we find that these general equilibrium eﬀects are not the most important ones, as follows. By taking the logarithm
of the growth rate (23) and diﬀerentiating it with respect to the eﬀective tax rate ~ , we find that the sum of the
opposing general equilibrium eﬀects is negative; the negative eﬀect of a fall in x(~pi;t) dominates the positive eﬀect
of a rise in the final output by shifting labor to the final good sector. Therefore, the primary force of raising the
growth-maximizing eﬀective tax rate is the direct eﬀect, which we mentioned in the text.
18In Chen’s (2003) model, although the growth-maximizing announced tax rate is higher than the output elasticity
of public service, it is ambiguous whether so is the growth-maximizing eﬀective tax rate. This is because the
household-firms need to pay some tangible cost to evade tax and it is included in the definition of the eﬀective tax
rate of that model. Therefore, Chen’s (2003) result is not necessarily suitable for a rigorous comparison with those
of Kafkalas et al. (2014) and this paper.
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4.2 Welfare-maximizing CIT Rate
Next, we analyze the welfare-maximizing CIT rate. Using the balanced growth rate, g^, the equi-
librium path of consumption is given by Ct = g^tC0 = g^tz^.19 Substituting it into the lifetime
utility function of the representative household, (14), we obtain
U0 =
z^1 
(1  ) [1  (1 + ) 1g^1 ] ; (26)
where 1 > (1 + ) 1g^1  holds by the TVC. The social welfare is determined by the initial level
of consumption and the long-run growth rate, both of which depend on the announced CIT rate,
 . Let us denote the welfare-maximizing announced CIT rate by WM .
Proposition 4.
1. When each firm declares its true operating profit, 1   q(1 + s)  0, WM > GM = 
holds. Therefore, the welfare-maximizing announced CIT rate, WM , is higher than the
growth-maximizing announced CIT rate, GM .
2. Suppose that 1  q(1 + s) > 0 and q = 0. Then, each firm understates its operating profit
and a marginal increase in the announced CIT rate at the growth-maximizing CIT rate
improves social welfare.
Proof: See Appendix G.
Proposition 4 shows that the welfare-maximizing CIT is higher than the growth-maximizing
one. 20 On the one hand, a marginal increase in CIT from GM does not aﬀect the growth
rate, because the first order eﬀect vanishes at  = GM . On the other hand, it increases current
consumption, because labor income, which is exempt from taxation, is raised by increases in pro-
ductive public services (see Appendix G). Therefore, the welfare-maximizing CIT rate is higher
than the growth-maximizing one.
19The economy jumps onto the balanced growth path in the initial period, as explained in section 3. Remember
that we assumed N0 = 1.
20In the case of underdeclaration of profits by firms (1  q(1 + s) > 0), we cannot reach such a statement when
q 6= 0. However, in Section 5, we conjecture that the statement may be true for the other values of q because we
could not find any counterexample.
15
5 Quantitative Analysis
Propositions 3 and 4 summarize that the following three eﬀects make WM larger than the output
elasticity of public services with tax evasion by firms (1  q(1 + s) > 0).
The first eﬀect is represented by WM > GM ; the welfare-maximizing announced tax rate
is higher than the growth-maximizing one. This is because the tax base is CIT, and wage income
is exempt from taxation as we have seen in Proposition 4. We call this the tax base eﬀect. The
second eﬀect is represented by GM > ~GM . This stems from the degree of tax evasion by firms,
( > ~ ). We call this the diﬀerence in tax rates. The third eﬀect is represented by ~GM > .
This is attributable to the eﬀect of CIT evasion, as mentioned in subsection 4.1
The objective of this section is to investigate how high the welfare maximizing CIT rate WM
is and which of the three eﬀects contributes most to it. To solve these quantitative problems, we
extend the above base model in this section.
5.1 Extended Model
We start with a small revision of the model, because the problematic restriction on the parameter
lies in the previous form of production technology. The output-elasticity of public services 
must be set at the price elasticity of intermediate good, 1=(1   ). To resolve this, we change
production technology (1) into
Yt = AL
1 
Y;t
Z Nt
0
(a(Gt; Nt)xi;t)
di; (27)
where
a(Gt; Nt) = G

tN
1 
t ; 0 <  < 1: (28)
The composite externality (28) represents a combination of the role of knowledge spillover, as in
Benassy (1998), together with productive public services, as in Barro (1990).
We adopt this form of the composite externality for the following two reasons. First, as will
become evident below and as stated by Chatterjee and Turnovsky (2012), it helps provide a plau-
sible calibration of the aggregate economy, something that is generically problematic in the con-
ventional one-sector endogenous growth model.21 Under (27) and (28), the output-elasticity of
21Chatterjee and Turnovsky (2012) consider the composite externality from physical capital, as in Romer (1986)
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public services is   (< ), which diﬀerentiates  from the output-elasticity of public ser-
vices. Second, as the following Remark shows, although we take an additional externality (the
spillover of knowledge) into account, the basic property of the benchmark model is maintained.
Remark. The qualitative results do not change in the extended model. By replacing  with ,
the same results as Proposition 3 and Proposition 4 hold.
Proof: See Appendix H.
5.2 Calibration
To conduct numerical exercises, we set the baseline parameter value as in Table 1. Appendix I
provides details of our calibration.
Insert Table 1 here.
The distribution of firms’ productivity is determined to make the curvature of the distribution
function of firm sizes in the model equal that of the Pareto distribution estimated with US data by
Axtell (2001). This requires  = 1.059. We choose  = 0.8620 so that the markup rate of firms
 (=  ()=  1) takes 20%, which is a standard value of markup rate of firms (e.g., Rotemberg
and Woodford (1999)).
We set the parameter to measure the knowledge spillover, , to 0.1160, so that the output
elasticity of public services, , equals 0.1. Although the estimates of the elasticity vary among
some empirical studies, 0.1 is one of the reasonable values of . 22
In this subsection, we provide the baseline value of announced CIT rate,  = 0.2706, to
determine the baseline balanced growth rate because the balanced growth rate depends on  in
this model economy. This value of  (= 0.2706) is the average CIT rate in OECD countries from
and productive public spending, as in Barro (1990) and Futagami, Morita and Shibata (1993) and conduct numerical
analyses, including growth and welfare eﬀects. Our application of (28) is in line with Chatterjee and Turnovsky
(2012) because in our model, the stock of Nt replaces the role of physical capital and is both the engine of growth
and the source of spillover and positive social returns to variety, as discussed in Romer (1986) and applied in R&D-
based growth models as in Aghion and Howit (1998), Benassy (1998), Reretto (2007), and others.
22From an empirical point of view, the output elasticity of infrastructure (or productive public services) has been
estimated and examined using data from many countries. Recent empirical studies (e.g., Ro¨ller and Waverman,
2001; Shioji, 2001; Esfahani and Ramı´rez, 2003; Kamps, 2006; Bom and Ligthart, 2014) indicate that the output
elasticity of infrastructure (or productive public services) lies in the range of 0.1–0.2, on average. More recent studies
by Bom and Ligthart, 2014 and Caldeo´n et al. (2015) indicate that the output elasticity of infrastructure is around
0.1.
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2000 to 2017. 23 We set penalty tax rate, s, to 0:5, according to Fullerton and Karayannis (1994),
who take this value as a normal rate in the US.
We set the benchmark value of audit rate, q, to 0:096. To obtain this value, we utilize the
statistics provided by the Internal Revenue Service. Each IRS Data Book between 2000 and 2017
provides the actual ratio of the examined corporations to all corporations under a classification by
firm size. 24 We choose the class of the smallest size of the large corporations. 25 This is because
such a class occupies a significantly large part (about 60%) of the large corporations, which are
corporations above a certain business size. Besides, the ratios of the audited corporations vary
greatly across the classes and so does the number of corporations in the classes. This means
that taking the average audit rate among the classes is unreasonable. Therefore, we set the audit
rate in such a manner. Later, we confirm the robustness of our results for a range of q, including
q = 0:089, the value adopted by Fullerton and Karayannis (1994).
We specify the functional form ofQ() byQ(q) = kq, where k is a constant. We set k = 0:167
to make Q(q) equal the ratio of inspection cost to the CIT revenue in the US on average from
2000 to 2017.26 However, not only the value but also the functional form does not change our
results because the growth rate of our model is independent of them: see (23).
We set  = 1.5 and  = 0.0204 according to Jones et al. (1993). These are the standard values
used in quantifying growth models. We set L = 1 for normalization. Finally, we choose the scale
parameter, A, and the cost of developing one intermediate good,  such that the balanced growth
rate equals 2%.27
The above benchmark parameter set realizes the case of tax evasion, q(1 + s)  1 < 0.
23The value of  does not strongly aﬀect the levels of growth- and welfare-maximizing CIT rates. Therefore, the
choice of the baseline value of  makes little diﬀerence in the quantitative results of our numerical exercises.
24We can collect the data from the archive of the prior year IRS Data Books in the Internal Revenue Service’s
website. These are downloadable at https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-prior-year-irs-data-books.
25According to the definition by the Internal Revenue Service, large corporations are those with assets greater
than 10 million dollars. The upper bound of the asset size of the smallest class is 50 million dollars.
26The source is IRS Data Book between 2000 and 2017.
27We do not eliminate the scale eﬀect explicitly in this calibration because we obtain the same results in Section
5.3 if we do. Following the method in pp. 302 of Barro and Sala-ı´-Martin (2004), we can eliminate the scale eﬀect
by imposing the relation  = B 21 L 11  , where B > 0. Given an arbitrary positive number B, we set  satisfying
the above equation. Given such , we set the scale parameterA to fix the growth rate to 2%. This modification leads
to the same quantities in Table 3. We can also adjust the value of  by varying B.
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5.3 Results
Main Results
Insert Table 2 here.
Table 2 provides the welfare-maximizing announced CIT rate, WM , the growth-maximizing
announced rate, GM , and the growth-maximizing eﬀective CIT rate, ~GM for the benchmark
case. We find that WM = 0.4025, GM = 0.3921, and ~GM = 0.3133. The value of the optimal
CIT rate, 0.4025, is close to the estimated value of 42% by Aghion et al. (2016). As Propositions
3 and 4 indicate, WM , GM , and ~GM are all larger than (= 0:1). Importantly, the diﬀerence
between WM and  is 0.3025, which is quite large.
The fourth, fifth, and sixth rows of Table 2 provide a decomposition of the total eﬀect, WM 
. The eﬀect of CIT evasion, ~GM , amounts to 0.2133 and is largest of the three eﬀects. Thus,
the eﬀect of CIT evasion is the primary source of the high optimal CIT rate quantitatively.
Robustness
The eﬀect of CIT evasion depends on the markup rate  (=  ()=  1) because it is related to
their market power. Therefore, we calculate the optimal CIT rates for the various markup rates:
see Table 3. 28
Insert Table 3 here.
Around the benchmark value (e.g., the case of markup rate = 0:1; :::; 0:5), we find that both
GM and WM are much higher than . In particular, the eﬀect of CIT evasion, ~GM   , is
significantly large for the alternative markup rates. This indicates that the eﬀect of CIT evasion
is the main source of the high optimal CIT rates.
Insert Table 4 here.
Unsurprisingly, the level of the optimal CIT rate substantially changes according to the output
elasticity of public services. However, we find that the impact of tax evasion remains relatively
28We choose the values of  so that the markup rates take the values listed in Table 3. See also Appendix I for
details of the calibration.
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strong for the alternative values of , the output elasticity of public services. 29 In Table 4, we
provide the ratio of the welfare-maximizing CIT rate to the output elasticity of public services,
WM=. Remember that the criterion in the comparison with the Barro rule is . Thus, for
example, although WM  0:1 in the case of  = 0:025, we can interpret this rate as a relatively
large value. Because the ratios in Table 4 show that the optimal CIT rates are much higher than
, we can confirm the eﬀect of tax evasion on the optimal CIT rate.
Next, we calculate the share of the eﬀect of CIT evasion in the total eﬀect, ~
GM 
WM  , for the
alternative values of . In the benchmark case, the share is 70%. For any case, the eﬀect of CIT
evasion occupies more than half of the total eﬀect. This ensures the robustness of the relative
importance of the eﬀect of CIT evasion.
Finally, we conduct a robustness check of the main result with respect to audit rate q.
Insert Figure 1 here.
Figure 1 illustrates the result. Indeed, the level of the optimal CIT rate changes according to q.
However, for the various alternative values of q, we can confirm that the eﬀect of CIT evasion is
the dominant factor of the high optimal CIT rate relative to the output elasticity of public services.
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6 Conclusion
This study investigates the optimal CIT in an endogenous growth model with productive public
services, incorporating tax evasion by monopolistically competitive firms of intermediate goods.
We show that the growth- and welfare-maximizing CIT rates are higher than the output elas-
ticity of productive public services. Thus, in view of tax evasion by firms, CIT should be higher
than the output elasticity of public services. This is mainly because the eﬀect of CIT evasion
mitigates the negative eﬀect of CIT on growth and increases the benefit of raising the CIT rate
for the provision of productive public services.
29As we mentioned in the calibration section, the estimations of  lie in the neighborhood of 0:10 in existing
empirical studies. Although the quantitative performance of the model heavily depends on , the range considered
here is suﬃciently wide to keep the model quantitatively plausible.
30In particular, consider q = 0:089. This is the value chosen in Fullerton and Karayannis (1994). Table 5 shows
that the results do not change for the benchmark parameter (other than q).
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Under the plausible parameter values, our numerical exercises show that the eﬀect of CIT
evasion is significantly large and the optimal level of the CIT rate is much higher than the output
elasticity of public services.
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Appendix
A Proof of Lemma 1
Suppose that a firm declares its profit truthfully (~i;t = i;t). Then, (7) can be rewritten as
ei;t = (1   )i;t. This is maximized at pi;t = wt=(b). From (6), we know that the firm’s true
profit is given by i;t = (1   )pi;tx(pi;t). Thus, if a firm setting the price at ~pi;t declares its
operating profit truthfully, (8) holds for the firm.
B Proof of Proposition 1
Proof of (i): Since ~i;t  i;t, (7) shows that ei;t = f1  q(1 + s)gi;t   f1  q(1 + s)g ~i;t.
Thus, if 1  q(1 + s) < 0, ei;t increases with ~i;t. Therefore, firms declare the largest ~i;t, which
is equal to i;t because of ~i;t  i;t.
Since all firms declare their true profit, we have ei;t = (1   )i;t. The maximization of
ei;t = (1   )i;t yields ~pi;t = wt=(bi). We can obtain the true profit by substituting ~pi;t into
(6). The expected after-tax profit follows from ei;t = (1   )i;t. Since ~i;t = i;t holds in (9),
we have ~ =  .
Next, if 1   q(1 + s) = 0, we obtain ei;t = (1   )i;t. In this case, the expected after-
tax profit is indiﬀerent between whether a firm declares its profit truthfully. The maximization
of ei;t = (1   )i;t yields the same results as in the case of truth-telling firms, ~i;t = i;t,
~pi;t = wt=(bi), and ~ =  .
Proof of (ii): We first prove the following lemma.
Lemma 2: Suppose 1   q(1 + s) > 0. If a firm sets the price at ~pi;t, then the declared profit of
the firm satisfies (8).
Proof of Lemma 2: To prove this lemma, we consider (a) firms that declare their operating profits
truthfully and (b) firms that declare their operating profits dishonestly.
(a) Consider firms that declare their operating profits truthfully. Lemma 1 shows that the
declared profit of these firms satisfies (8).
(b) We next consider the following two types of dishonest firms: those that do not declare (8)
and those that declare (8).
We begin with a firm of the first type that declares ~~i;t, which is not equal to (8). From
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Assumption (i), this firm is audited with probability one, q = 1. Thus, the expected after-tax
profit of this firm is given by
~~ei;t = i;t    ~~i;t   1 (1 + s)
 
i;t   ~~i;t

: (B.1)
We next consider a dishonest firm that declares (8). FromAssumption (ii), this firm is audited
with a probability lower than one, q = q 2 [0; 1). The expected after-tax profit of this type of
dishonest firms is given by
~ei;t = i;t    ~i;t   q(1 + s)(i;t   ~i;t): (B.2)
Suppose ~ei;t < ~~ei;t holds. This implies that a dishonest firm declares ~~i;t, which is not equal
to (8). Using (B.1) and (B.2), we rearrange ~ei;t < ~~ei;t as follows:
i;t    ~i;t   q(1 + s)(i;t   ~i;t) < i;t    ~~i;t   (1 + s)
 
i;t   ~~i;t

;
, (1 + s)(1  q)i;t   [1  q(1 + s)]~i;t < s~~i;t;
) (1 + s)(1  q)i;t   [1  q(1 + s)]~i;t < si;t;
, [1  q(1 + s)]i;t < [1  q(1 + s)]~i;t:
The third line uses the fact ~~i;t  i;t. If 1  q(1+ s) > 0, the inequality in the last line indicates
 < ~i;t, which contradicts ~~i;t  i;t. Thus, dishonest firms declare (8). Lemma 2 is proved.
From Lemma 2, we have that ei;t = (1  ~)i;t = [1  q(1 + s) ]i;t   [1  q(1 + s)] ~i;t,
where ~i;t is given by (8). Firms maximize this ei;t by choosing pi;t. The first-order condition is
given by
@ei;t
@~pi;t
= LY;t(A)
1
1 G

1 
t ~p
  1
1 
i;t


1  q(1 + s)
(1  )bi

 bi + wt
~pi;t

+ [1  q(1 + s)]

= 0 (B.3)
Since 1   q(1 + s) > 0 holds, we have that 0 < (1   )[1   q(1 + s)] < [1   q(1 + s)] <
1   q(1 + s) , which ensures the second-order condition. Solving this condition yields (11).
Since 1   q(1 + s) > 0 and (1   )[1   q(1 + s)] < 1   q(1 + s) , we have  () > 1, and
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hence, ~pi;t > wt=(bt). If we substitute (11) into (6), we obtain (12). From ei;t = (1   ~)i;t
and (12), we obtain (13).
Here, let us define
()   () 1 = 1  (1  )[1  q(1 + s)]
1  q(1 + s) (< 1): (B.4)
Substituting (8) and (12) into (9), we have
~

= [1  q(1 + s)] 1  
1  () + q(1 + s) (B.5)
First, we can easily show that ~ <  because of [1   q(1 + s)] 1 
1 () + q(1 + s)   1 = [1  
q(1 + s)]
h
1 
1 ()   1
i
< 0, where () < 1 and 1  q(1 + s) > 0.
Second, from the definition of () and (B.5), lim
!0
~ = 0 and ~ j=1 = 1 + q(1 + s)
1 + 
, and
therefore, we have ~ 2

0; 1+q(1+s)
1+
i
.
C Relationship between ~ and 
From (B.4), we obtain
0() =  (1  )[1  q(1 + s)]
[1  q(1 + s) ]2 < 0; (C.1)
d()
dq
=
(1  )(1  )(1 + s)
[1  q(1 + s) ]2 > 0; (C.2)
or both  0() > 0 and d ()=dq < 0. From (B.5) and (C.1), we obtain d(=~)=d > 0. From
(B.5), (C.2), and () < 1, we obtain d(=~)=d(q(1 + s)) < 0.
Finally, we prove d~=d > 0. From (B.5),
d~
d
=
[1  q(1 + s)](1  )
[1  ()]2 [1  () + 
0()] + q(1 + s) (C.3)
Thus, we have d~
d
> 0, if and only if
1  () + 0() >   [1  ()]
2q(1 + s)
[1  q(1 + s)](1  ) (C.4)
From 0() < 0 and 00() < 0, d
d
[1 ()+0()] =  0()+00() < 0 holds. This
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indicates that the LHS of (C.4) is decreasing in  . Furthermore, the RHS of (C.4) is decreasing
in  because of () < 1 and 0() < 0. Thus, d~
d
> 0 for any  2 (0; 1) if the minimum
value of the LHS of (C.4), 1  (1) + 0(1), is larger than the maximum value of the RHS,
  [1 (0)]2q(1+s)
[1 q(1+s)](1 ) . Using (0) = 1, (1) =  and 
0(1) =   1 
1 q(1+s) , we obtain
1  (1) + 0(1) 

  [1  (0)]
2q(1 + s)
[1  q(1 + s)](1  )

=
(1  )[1  q(1 + s)]
1  q(1 + s) > 0; (C.5)
and therefore, d~
d
> 0 for any  2 (0; 1).
D Derivation of equilibrium conditions
The price level of firm i and j whose productivity is bi and bj is ~pi;t = biwt and ~pj;t =

bj
wt,
where = 1( (~)) for 1 q(1+s)  (>)0. Combining these with (3) yields pi;t
pj;t
=

xi;t
xj;t
 1
=
bj
bi
. Thus, we have xi;t =

bj
bi
 1
 1
xj;t. This together with (1), (2), and (3) rewrites ~pi;t = biwt
into
xi;t =
2LY;t
(1  )b
1
 1
i
R
b

1 dF (b)Nt
: (D.1)
From (19) and (D.1), we obtain labor employed in the final good sector as follows:
LY;t =
(1  )
(1  ) + 2L: (D.2)
Substituting (D.2) into (D.1) leads to
x(~pi;t) =

2
(1  ) + 2

b
1
1 
iR
b

1 dF (b)
L
Nt
: (D.3)
From (1) and (3), we obtain
R Nt
0
pi;txi;tdi = Yt. Combining
R Nt
0
pi;txi;tdi = Yt with
ei;t = (1   ~) (1   1) ~pi;tx(~pi;t), we obtain the total expected after-tax operating profit,
Nt
R
ei;tdF (b) = (1   ~)(1    1)Yt. By combining the total expected after-tax operating
profit with (5), we obtain the gross interest rate
Rt 1 =
(1  ~)(1   1)Yt
Nt
: (D.4)
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Combining i;t = (1    1)~pi;tx(~pi;t) with
R Nt
0
pi;txi;tdi = Yt, the budget constraint
of the government (17) is rewritten into Gt + Mt = ~(1    1)Yt. Dividing both sides
of the final good market clearing condition, Yt = Ct + Nt+1 + Gt + Mt, by Nt and using
Gt +Mt = ~(1   1)Yt yield
Nt+1
Nt
=
1


1  ~  1   1 Yt
Nt
  Ct
Nt

; (D.5)
and substituting (D.4) into (15), we obtain
Ct+1
Ct
=

(1  ~) (1   1)
(1 + )
Yt+1
Nt+1
1=
: (D.6)
Substituting i;t = (1   1) ~pi;tx(~pi;t) into (18) reduces to Gt = [1 Q(q)]~(1  1)Yt.
Combining it with (1), (D.2), and (D.3), we obtain Yt
Nt
= 
(~). Substituting Yt
Nt
= 
(~) into
(D.5) and (D.6) and dividing (D.6) by (D.5) leads to (20).
E Proof of Proposition 2
Let us define the right-hand side (RHS) of (20) as #(zt)  
1  1 [(1 ~)(1  1)
(~)=(1+)]1=zt
[1 ~(1  1)]
(~) zt .
Here, note that the denominator of #(zt): [1   ~(1    1)]
(~)   zt must be positive, that
is, zt < z  [1   ~(1    1)]
(~), otherwise Nt eventually equals to zero from (D.5):
Nt+1
Nt
= 1

f[1  ~ (1   1)] 
(~)  ztg. When Nt = 0, both output and consumption equal
to zero, which violates the first order condition of the representative household.
The properties of #(zt) for zt 2 [0; z) are as follows:
#(0) = 0; lim
zt!z
#(zt) = +1;
#0(zt) =
1 
1
 [(1  ~)(1   1)
(~)=(1 + )]1=[1  ~(1   1)]
(~)
f[1  ~(1   1)]
(~)  ztg2 > 0;
#0(0) =
 [(1  ~) (1   1)(1 + ) 1 1
(~)]1=
[1  ~ (1   1)] 
(~) ; limzt!z #
0(zt) = +1
#00(zt) =
21 
1
 [(1  ~)(1   1)
(~)=(1 + )]1=[1  ~(1   1)]
(~)
f[1  ~(1   1)]
(~)  ztg3 > 0: (E.1)
(E.1) indicates that #(zt) is monotonically increasing and convex function of zt and takes zero
when zt = 0.
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On the other hand, the left-hand side (LHS) of (20) represents 45 line. Thus, we find that a
unique steady state z^ 2 (0; z), which is unstable exists if and only if #0(0) < 1 holds. From (D.5),
(D.6) and Yt=Nt = 
(), Ct, Nt, and Yt grow at the same constant rate, Ct+1=Ct = Nt+1=Nt =
Yt+1=Yt = g^ in the steady state.
The rest of this appendix shows that the TVC (16) ensures #0(0) < 1. (23) and the asset
market clearing condition, Wt = Nt+1 together with the assumption N0 = 1 transform the
TVC (16) into limt!1 z^
  g^t(1 )
(1+)t
= 0. To satisfy the TVC, 1 > (1 + ) 1g^1  must holds.
1 > (1 + ) 1g^1  and (23) together with (1 ~)(1 
 1)
1 ~(1  1) < 1 lead to #
0(0) < 1.
F Proof of Proposition 3
F.1 Proof of 1
In this case, since each firm does not evade CIT,  = 1 and ~ =  . Then, by (21) and (23), we
obtain ~GM = GM =  immediately.
F.2 Proof of 2
In the beginning, note that the decision of optimal announced CIT rate is equivalent to that of
the optimal eﬀective CIT rate. This is because ~ is the function of  from (B.5), and ~ is strictly
increasing in  , d~=d > 0, for any  2 (0; 1], as shown in Appendix C.
Because the growth rate converges to 0 as  goes to 0 by the construction of the model, the
growth rate is maximized at 1 or some interior point in (0; 1).
First, we prove that the growth-maximizing eﬀective CIT is higher thanwhen it is an interior
point in (0; 1). From the definition of 
(~) and (D.6), growth maximization with respect to ~ is
equivalent to max
~
f(~) = ln(1  ~)~ 1  [1  ()] 11 ()
h
()
1 +2()
i 1
1  , subject to (B.5):
~

= [1  q(1 + s)] 1 
1 () + q(1 + s). The first derivative of f(~) is
f 0(~) =

  1
1  ~ +

1  
1
~| {z }
	1(~)

+

1  
d
d~
0()

1
()
  1
1  ()  

1   + 2()| {z }
	2()

:
(F.1)
It is obvious that 	1(~) =   11 ~ + 1  1 =  ~(1 ~)(1 )~  0 for ~  . Next, we show that the
31
sign of 	2() is negative for ~  .
sign	2() = [1  ()][1   + 2()]  ()[1   + 2()]  ()[1  ()]
=  3()2   (1  )[(1 + 2)()  1] (F.2)
Here, sign	2() < 0 for () > 11+2 . Furthermore, (B.4) and (B.5) indicate that () is
increasing in q(1+s) and when q(1+s) = 0, () = 1 (1 ) ,  = ~
1 ~ and (
~
1 ~ ) =
1 ~
1 ~
hold. From 1 ~
1 ~   11+2 =  ~+(1 ~)(1 ~)(1+2) > 0, we obtain ( ~1 ~ ) = 1 ~1 ~ > 11+2 for ~  .
Thus, sign	2() < 0 for ~  . Combining	1(~)  0 and	2(~) < 0 for ~  with 0() < 0
((B.5)) and d~
d
> 0, we obtain f 0(~) > 0 for ~  . From the discussion so far, we find that
~GM >  holds.
Next, we consider the case of the corner solution of growth-maximization: GM = 1. As-
suming q(1 + s) > (1+) 1

additionally, we ensure that ~GM >  because ~ j=1 = 1+q(1+s)1+ .31
G Proof and intuition of Proposition 4
(i) Proof of 1
The maximization condition of social welfare is @U
@
= 0. By (26), this is equivalent to

1  (1 + ) 1g^1 @z^
@
+ (1 + ) 1z^g^ 
@g^
@
= 0: (G.1)
From (22) and (23), with  = 1, we obtain z^ = 1 (1 )
 1(1+) 1(1 )(1 ) g^
   g^: Diﬀerentiating
it with respect to  yields @z^
@
= (1+)
(1 )

1 (1 )
(1 )2 g^
 + 1 (1 )
1  g^
 1 @g^
@

   @g^
@
: Substituting it
into (G.1) and rearranging it using z^ = 1 (1 )
 1(1+) 1(1 )(1 ) g^
   g^, we have
@g^
@
=  

1  (1 + ) 1g^1  (1+)[1 (1 )]
(1 )(1 )2 g^

K
; (G.2)
31The parameter restriction q(1+s) > (1+) 1 holds in a plausible parameter region because the valid range of
, the output elasticity of public service is around 0:1, according to empirical studies. See the calibration in Section
5.2. The corner point  = 1 can be optimal because the eﬀective CIT rate is lower than 1 when firms evade CIT. If
q(1+ s) is small and  is large, the eﬀective CIT rate becomes low, even though the growth-maximization CIT rate
is high. Thus, the corner solution  = 1 is optimal in such a case.
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where K = [1  (1 + ) 1g^1 ] (1+)[1 (1 ) ]
(1 )(1 ) g^
 1 + 1 (1 )
(1 )(1 ) > 0. Therefore, by (G.2),
we find that @g^
@
j=WM < 0. This implies GM < WM because g^ is a single-peaked function of
 (see (23) and the definition of 
(~) with  = 1).
(ii) Proof of 2
Since signfdU
d
j=GMg = signf @z^@ j=GMg, we show @z^@ j=GM > 0 for q = 0. From (23) and
(22), with  =  () = () 1, we obtain z^ = 1 [1 ()]~
 1(1+) 1(1 ~)[1 ()] g^
   g^; Diﬀerentiating
it with respect to  , we obtain
@z^
@

=GM
= g^
(1  ()) [1  (1  ())] d~
d
+ (1  ~)0()
 1(1 + ) 1 [(1  ())(1  ~)]2 (G.3)
Here, let us define the numerator of (G.3) as J . Through simple algebra, we have () = 1  
(1  ) and ~ =  1 
1 ()

 . Hence, utilizing these, we have
J =

1  (1  )(1  )3
(1  ())1  (1  )(1  )1   + (1 + ): (G.4)
Equation (G.4) ensures that J > 0 for any  2 (0; 1]. This completes the proof.
(iii) Intuition of Proposition 4
For an intuitive interpretation, we focus on the marginal eﬀect of raising the tax rate on the
growth-maximizing rate, GM . By (26), the lifetime utility, U0, depends on the long-run growth
rate, g^, and the initial consumption, z^. At  = GM , the marginal eﬀect of raising  on g^
disappears. Then, the CIT rate aﬀects welfare only through the eﬀect on initial consumption:
sign

dU
d
j=GM
	
= sign

@z^
@
j=GM
	
. Note that by (22) and (D.4) in Appendix D, the initial
consumption is decomposed into
z^ =

1  ~  1   1
(~)| {z }
disposable income
  (1  ~)  1   1(1 + ) 1 1
(~)| {z }
=R=(1+)
1=
:
Because the second term depends on the interest rate, this is a Slutsky decomposition of the initial
consumption. Since the interest rate is also maximized at  = GM , the marginal eﬀect on the
second term disappears here. Consequently, the marginal eﬀect of raising  on z^ at  = GM
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equals that on the disposable income of household.
The disposable income of a household increases by raising  from GM marginally. Thus,
GM < WM . Raising  increases before tax income 
(~). While 
(~) includes both labor
and asset income, CIT is imposed only on the source of asset income, that is, the firms’ profits.
Thus, the disposable income of a household increases as a whole. It suggests that the break in
the coincidence of growth- and welfare-maximization tax rates is because the tax base is CIT.32
H Proof of Remark
The counterpart of Proposition 4 is proved the sameway as Proposition 4 because our calculations
do not depend on the expression of the growth rate, g^, which is the unique diﬀerence between
the baseline and extended model. We can prove the counterpart of Proposition 3 in the Remark
by modifying Appendix F as follows.
Under the production technology of the final goods, (27) and (28), the wage rate, (2) and the
price of intermediate goods, (3) are rewritten into wt = (1   )L Y;t
R Nt
0
(a(Gt; Nt)xi;t)
di =
(1 ) Yt
LY;t
and pi;t = AL1 Y;t a(Gt; Nt)x
 1
i;t , respectively. Other equations remain unchanged
with the following exceptions. The definition of 
(~) changes into

(~) A 11  (1 Q(q))~  1   1 1  [(1  )] 1 1  21   L
(1  ) + 2
 1
1 

Z
b

1 dF (b)
 1 
1 
(H.1)
By (23) and (H.1), we have ~GM = argmax (1 ~)~ 1  (1  1) 11  1 1 

 1
1 +2 1
 1
1  .
(F.1) changes as follows:
f 0(~) =

  1
1  ~ +

1  
1
~| {z }
~	1(~)

+

1  
d
d~
0()	2(): (H.2)
Immediately, ~	1 =  ~(1 ~)(1 )~  0 for ~  . As in Appendix F, sign	2() < 0 for ~  
because of  < . This indicates that ~GM   in the case of the interior solution. Besides, we
32When the tax system is household total income tax, as in Barro (1990) and Kafkalas et al. (2014), this eﬀect
vanishes. In fact, we find that the first term of z^ is replaced by (1   ~)
(~), and hence, welfare-maximization is
equivalent to growth-maximization; see (23).
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discuss the case of the corner solution (GM = 1) in the same way as Appendix F. 33
I Details of calibration
We seek to obtain quantitative implications for tax evasion in OECD countries.
 The distribution of productivity is set in such a way that the distribution of firm size is set
to the Pareto distribution, which is estimated by Axtell (2001).
By (D.1) and (D.2), letting N0 = 1, we have
xi
bi
=

2
(1  ) () + 2

LR
b

1 dF (b)| {z }
B
b

1 
i ;
where  () = 1 q(1+s)
1 q(1+s) (1 )

1 q(1+s)


. This is the size of intermediate good firms. To
make its distribution a Pareto distribution, we set the distribution of b

1  to Pareto distribu-
tion with scale parameter  > 0 and shape parameter  > 1. Then, letting SCALE = B,
because
R
b

1 dF (b) =   1
 
 in B, the distribution of firm size is the Pareto distribution
with scale parameter
SCALE =
2
(1  ) () + 2
   1
 
L; (I.1)
and shape parameter  . Since the shape parameter is the most important factor of firm
distribution, we set  = 1:059 according to the estimate in Axtell (2001), which uses US
data.
 Next, we control the markup rate of intermediate good firms. Letting the markup rate be
, by (11),
 ()

= 1 + : (I.2)
As the benchmark value of , we adopt 0:2, a usual value of the macroeconomic model
33An additional parameter restriction is q(1 + s) > (1+) 1 . This is a quantitatively reasonable assumption, as
we explain at the end of Appendix F.
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with imperfect competition. 34
 To determine the value of the remaining parameters, we set the benchmark value of ; q
and s exogenously, as shown in Table 1. For their source, see Table 1 and the text.
 There are four undetermined parameters for (I.1) and (I.2), ;L;SCALE, and . Here, we
put L =  = 1 and determine  and SCALE by (I.1) and (I.2). Note that productivity b
follows the Pareto distribution with scale parameter 

1  and shape parameter 1 

 , since
we assume b

1  follows the Pareto distribution with scale parameter  and shape parameter
 . Because the scale of productivity may be arbitrarily fixed whenever the distribution of
firm size is properly controlled, we set  = 1. We simply normalize L = 1. Since the
number of the intermediate good firms is a continuum, the minimum of firm size among
them does not have to correspond to the minimal number of employees in actual data (and
only the shape of the distribution, the curvature of the density function, matters). Thus,
we do not care about the magnitude of parameter SCALE, which is determined by (I.1)
for given  and the other parameters. Parameter  is pinned down by the condition of the
markup rate, (I.2).
 We explain the determination of . Through long but straightforward algebra, (I.2) can be
rearranged as the quadratic equation with respect to  as follows: 22 + 1 + 0 = 0,
where 2 = (1 + )

1  q(1 + s) , 1 = (1 + )(1  ) and 0 =  1  q(1 + s).
By 2 > 0 and 1 > 0, a necessary and suﬃcient condition for a unique solution in (0; 1)
is 0 < 0 and 2+1+0 > 0, which holds for any parameter set. The solution is given
by  =  1+
p
21 420
22
.
 Finally, by (23), we choose the value of A 11 "= to fix the long-run growth rate to 2%.
This completes the parameter specification for conducting the numerical exercises.
34For example, Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) adopt this value. However, because markup rate is a key param-
eter of our analysis, we conduct numerical exercises for alternative values. See Table 3.
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Table 1: Baseline Parameter Value
benchmark source
 1:059 Axtell (2001)
 :8620 markup rate = :2
 :1160 @ lnY=@ lnG = :1
 :2706 average CIT rate of OECD countries
q :096 average audit rate of the majority class of the US large corporations
s :5 Fullerton and Karayannis (1994)
k :1667 Q(q) = kq, enforcement budget and CIT revenue of the IRS
 1:5 Jones et al. (1993)
 :0204 Jones et al. (1993)
L 1 normalization
A
1
1 = 34.2321 growth rate = :02
Table 2: The welfare- and growth-maximizing tax rates and the contributions to WM   for the
benchmark
WM :4025
GM :3921
~GM :3133
 .1000
the tax base eﬀect: WM   GM :0104
the diﬀerence in tax rates: GM   ~GM :0787
the eﬀect of CIT evasion: ~GM    :2133
total eﬀect: WM    :3025
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Table 3: The optimal CIT rates for alternative markup rates (benchmark: markup rate = :20)
markup rate :10 :20 :30 :40 :50 :75 1:00
WM :5258 :4025 :3324 :2868 :2549 :2058 :1783
GM :5077 :3921 :3248 :2806 :2493 :2007 :1733
~GM :3761 :3133 :2718 :2422 :2201 :1835 :1617
WM   GM :0181 :0104 :0075 :0062 :0056 :0050 :0050
GM   ~GM :1315 :0787 :0529 :0383 :0291 :0171 :0116
~GM    :2761 :2133 :1718 :1422 :1201 :0835 :0617
WM    :4258 :3025 :2324 :1868 :1549 :1058 :0783
Table 4: We provide WM , the ratio of WM to , and the shares of the eﬀect of CIT evasion in
the total eﬀect for alternative output elasticities of public services (benchmark:  = :10).
 :025 :05 :10 :15 :20
WM :0986 :1980 :4025 :6188 :8488
WM= 3:94 3:96 4:03 4:13 4:24
~GM 
WM  :8833 :8225 :7025 :6000 :5084
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Table 5: The optimal tax rates in the case of q = :089 for the benchmark
WM :4162
GM :4056
~GM :3203
 .1000
the tax base eﬀect: WM   GM :0105
the diﬀerence in tax rates: GM   ~GM :0853
the eﬀect of CIT evasion: ~GM    :2203
total eﬀect: WM    :3162
Figure 1: The growth- and welfare-maximizing tax rates (WM , GM , ~GM , and contributions to
WM >  for alternative values of q)
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